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Yugoslav Views on Pluralism and Poland
Summary:

A veteran party official in Yugoslavia
recently warned Yugoslav
Communists not to
relinquish political power in the way their
counterparts in Poland had done. Media coverage
of Polish affairs has taken its place in the
domestic Yugoslav
debate
about
political
pluralism.

* * *
Dusan
Ckrebic,
one
of Serbia's representatives in
Yugoslavia's 23-member Presidium of the League of Communists'
Central Committee (LCY CC),
said on September 2 that the LCY
"must not relinquish power as happened in Poland or agree to
become a parliamentary opposition,
as in Hungary." 1 Ckrebic,
who at 62 is the Presidium's oldest member,
added that the LCY
is "in real terms the strongest political power" in Yugoslavia,
"particularly in Serbia." He said that the party "should not
r elinquish its influence" over Yugoslav society.
The
Debate over Pluralism in Yugoslavia.
Ckrebic's
comments were made at a meeting with industrial managers at the
Smederevo Steel Enterprise in the Serbian town of Smederevo near
Belgrade and are the first statement on recent developments in
Poland by a high-ranking Yugoslav party official. His remarks,
of course, have at least as much to do with the internal
Yugoslav discussion of pluralism as they do with events in
Poland; and they should
not
be interpreted as the LCY
Presidium's official line or the consensus of the party's rank
and file on the issue. Indeed, the Serbian leadership is known
to take a particularly hard .line within the party; and the
absence of any official statement on Poland suggests sharp
differences of opinions within the LCY over the issue of
political pluralism and the possibility of coalition governments
in which the party would share political power with opposition
parties.
Political pluralism is an issue that has been raised many
times before in Yugoslavia.
At present probably a small
majority of Yugoslav Communists would reject the idea of
coalitions with opposition parties. 2
An official LCY line is
likely to be agreed before the 14th party congress tentatively
scheduled for mid-December,
and any statement on the issue by
the Presidium will have a crucial bearing on the LCY's draft
document on political pluralism currently under preparation. In
the meantime,
the republican party leaderships in Slovenia and
Macedonia are giving serious consideration to the possibility of
allowing opposition parties to compete against the LCY in direct
elections.
Ckrebic's comments will no doubt add to the political war
of words between conservatives and liberals. The conservatives,

-
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such as Ckrebic, insist that Communists "should retain a
democratic attitude to
those
who think differently, but
minorities should not be permitted to form factions within the
party." This remark by Ckrebic was clearly meant as a warning to
Slovenian Communists. Serbian Communists, under the leadership
of Slobodan Milosevic, have been largely responsible for the
criticism of the Slovenes' more liberal approach to reforming
the country's political system. They say that the kind of
political reforms envisaged in Slovenia would lead to the
republic's eventual secession from the loosely knit Yugoslav
federation. The Slovenes have repeatedly denied such charges.
Over the past year the Slovenian communist hierarchy,
led
by President Milan Kucan,
has tolerated the establishment of
independent political groups in the republic; and some leaders
talk of permitting noncommunist political groups to vie for
posts in the republican government and for seats in the
Slovenian national assembly during next May's elections.
They
have also encouraged round-table meetings with representatives
of these independent groups and put forward the possibility of a
coalition with non-Communists should the party fail to gain a
majority next May.
Advocates of this move see it as the most
democratic means of bringing an end to the party's monopoly on
power.
While the LCY's leadership is largely agreed on ending the
party's monopoly on power, it is, however, deeply divided over
how this end should be achieved.
Indeed, even among Slovenian
Communists there is an undercurrent of opposition to Kucan's
policies. Franc Popit, who was President of Slovenia's CC during
the 1960s and 1970s,
recently resigned from the Slovenian CC,
complaining that the liberals in the Slovenian party were
"flirting with the opposition . . . [and] making a big political
mistake by sitting on their hands" in the face of a growing
opposition in Slovenia. 3
In an unprecedented development,
the Macedonian Central
Committee on August 31 issued a draft program on economic and
political reforms that it intends to adopt at its 10th party
congress in late November; the congress is being held in
preparation for the 14th (Extraordinary) Congress of the LCY. 4
The Macedonian party's document, read by Svetomir Skaric,
one
of the 14 members on the Macedonian CC Presidium, stated that
Macedonian Communists would insist on the establishment of the
system of direct elections; and it defined political pluralism
as the "the right of all citizens to political association,
including the right to form political parties." It said that
this right should be "introduced in place of the freedom of
association guaranteed under the current Yugoslav constitution."
According to Skaric,
"a multiparty system may become a reality
even in our country [Yugoslavia] . • . if the citizens so
determine." The Macedonian party President,
Jakov Lazarovski,
supported the constitutional guarantee of the right to political
association but emphasized the possibility of a two-party system
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in which the LCY would compete in elections with a reorganized
Socialist Alliance--reorganized from its longstanding function
as the party's umbrella organization into an alliance of
alternative political groups.
The wording of the Macedonian call for political reform is
mor~ radical
than
any other official party document in
Yugoslavia dealing with political pluralism in that the term
multiparty system is used openly to label the kind of system
envisaged by the program.
Moreover,
the call comes from a
traditionally hard-line republic. So far in Macedonia, however,
there are none of the independent political associations to be
found
in
Slovenia,
Croatia,
Montenegro,
or BosniaHerzegovina.
Marin Buble,
a member of Croatia's Central
Committee, recently made a similar call for a multiparty system
and said that such a system in Yugoslavia "is unavoidable and
necessary." He also said that "last year it was unthinkable to
speak of a multiparty system in Poland and Hungary,
just as it
is today [in Yugoslavia] • . . ; yet today multiple parties are
in action [in Poland and Hungary]." 5
Media Coverage of Polish Affairs.
The Yugoslav media have
given a generally balanced coverage of recent developments in
Poland.
The Zagreb weekly Danas6 commented on "how times have
changed." The weekly remarked that "traditionally communist
revolutionaries" had opposed
"conservative
adversaries of
democratic changes" in Poland but that "today the party opposes
change and only by force accepts democratic pluralism." The
weekly concluded that in Poland "the party has lost,
but not
the Communists.
Dogma is being destroyed,
but socialism
remains." Conunenting on Tadeusz Mazowiecki's appointment as
Poland's Prime Minister, the Belgrade weekly NIN said: nTo some
it is a success for the concept of political changes, to others
it is the beginning of a revolution." 7
Prior to Mazowiecki's appointment some Yugoslav radio
stations commented on the developments.
Radio Zagreb on August
19
led off its international news feature by saying:
"It
appears that Poland will be the fi.rst socialist country with a
civilian opposition governrnent." 8 The commentator Zrnka Novak
optimistically assessed the developments by saying:
"In its
painstaking progress toward democracy, Poland is now on the way
to resolving its governmental crisis." She said that "Poland's
first coalition government will be burdened with many unusual
problems compared with governments in traditional parliamentary
democracies" and concluded that the Catholic Church would be
able · to help Solidarity "in its role of explaining the new
qualities of the relationship between the state and society."
On
said:

August 20 Radio Belgrade's commentator Branislav

Canak
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Choosing Mazowiecki as Prime Minister immediately poses the
question of whether this is a reflection of the unavoidable
reality of the balance of power in the Polish political
scene, or whether this choice has been imposed by the sheer
exhaustion of possibilities. Both factors were probably at
play. This is encouraging, however, because under the same
circumstances some politicians in the not so distant past
would have resorted to cutting the Gordian knot with a
sword.
Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki will be warmly
but it is unlikely that this will significantly
welcomed,
increase the chances of receiving the $10 billion aid [that
Solidarity has estimated Poland needs].
Perhaps the most
notable thing in this act of nominating a prominent
Solidarity member as Prime Minister lies in the fact that
it will become crystal clear to everybody inside and
outside Poland that there are no magic wands and that the
fate of the country has been and will remain in the hands
of its people.
Solidarity will not be able to pull Poland
out of its crisis alone. 9

Radio Belgrade concluded by saying that Mazowiecki, like his
predecessor Kiszcak, would face "some stormy days" ahead and
might fail "to form a generally acceptable government." The
radio did not make clear just who might not find the government
acceptable, but it seemed to be suggesting that the Polish
United Workers Party might raise objections.
Milan

Andrejevich

1

Politika (Belgrade), 3 September 1989.

2

Vjesnik (Zagreb), 24 June 1989.

3

Delo (Ljubljana), 30 August 1989.

4

Borba (Belgrade),

5

Vecernji List(Zagreb),
11 September 1989; Borba,
13 September 1989.
Reprint of interview in Slobodna Dalmacija (Split), 11 September 1989.

6

Danas {Zagreb), 29 August 1989.

1

NIN (Belgrade), 27 August 1989.

8

Radio Zagreb, 19 August 1989, 1:00 P.M.

9

Radio Belgrade, 20 August 1989, 8:00 A.M.

1 September 1989; Vjesnik,

1 September 1989.
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Yugoslav Commission Proposes Changes to Party Statutes
Summary:

A
commission of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia has proposed changing
the party's ·statutes as a means of bringing
about much needed
reform to the country's
political system.
Although the proposals call
for a streamlining of the
party's Central
Committee and a reorganization of its hierarchy,
the divided LCY CC remains ambivalent on such
crucial issues as political pluralism and the
ideological transformation of the party.

* * *
On September 11 at the 26th Central Committee plenum of the
League
of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY),
the party's
commission in charge of reforming the LCY Statutes issued its
proposals. Practical changes are still a long way off, however,
and the party remains deeply divided over reforms. Indeed, the
party still seems given to generating much empty talk and vague
"decisions." At the plenum, for example, the Central Committee
reiterated its opposition to the party's monopoly on political
power and said that the party had to take a firm stand over its
future role in Yugoslav society; but what such proclamations
mean in practice is unclear.
On the whole,
it does seem,
however,
that the proposals made at the plenum fell far short
of the fundamental changes to the country's political structure
that many
Yugoslavs,
including
some within the party
leadership,
see as needed before market-oriented economic
reforms can go ahead.
Party Reform in the Making?
The plenum's opening speech
was by Ivan Brigic,
who spoke in his capacity as chairman of
the commission on the LCY Statutes.
Brigic is a Bosnian Croat
and one of the representatives from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
Central Committee's 23-member Presidium.
He said that debating
what course the LCY should take would make a major contribution
to overcoming divisions in the party and the country's general
economic and political crisis. 1
Brigic
said
that there were some "very pronounced"
conservative ideas inside the LCY, according to ~hich the party
"should consolidate its position as a monolithic body and the
highest arbiter in resolving conflicts of interest in society."
At the same time,
he said,
there was also a growing movement
advocating that the LCY "replace the state-party model with a
modern
democratic
political system adjusted to political
pluralism and competition among political ideas and programs."
Brigic said the commission on the LCY Statues had decided to
avoid these radical views.
It had decided that "only a deep
democratic reform of the LCY would prevent the return to a
state-party model" and that "even the party's monopolistic
position within the political system should be changed."

.l
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This formulation seems deliberately vague, and Brigic did
not directly discuss the possibility of a multiparty system and
direct elections in which the LCY would compete with opposition
groups. The commission merely recommended that the current 1974
federal constitution,
which enshrines the leading role of the
party,
be "abandoned during the work on a new Yugoslav
constitution" and that the role of the party be determined on
the basis of "its democratic position in society."
The commission's report did call for the principle of
democratic centralism to be retained. This principle, conceived
by Lenin and adapted to Yugoslav conditions by Tito, obliges the
party to listen to all opinions voiced in party forums but
requires minorities to be subordinate to the will of the
majority (which usually means in practice the will of the party
leadership).
Brigic said that minority opinions in the party
should have the right "to
fight
without
impeding
the
implementation of the majority decision." He explained that
respecting
minority
views
"does
not
represent
the
institutionalization of a minority" but was simply part of the
decision-making process.
In response to Brigic's report,
Milan Pancevski,
who is
President of the CC Presidium and one of its Macedonian
representatives,
said that without democratic centralism "the
party would become a debating society and a political forum."
Some party members have argued that a major weakness of the LCY
has been the degeneration of democratic
centralism
into
bureaucratic centralism. They argue that the party is, in fact,
eight parties--one for every republic and autonomous province
and each pursuing its own interests--and that this development
has alienated the party's two million members from the party
leadership.
Ivo Druzic,
a Croat and member of the LCY CC,
resigned
from Brigic's
commission because of these problems.
He
explained that the commission's stand had merely conveyed the
positions of regional party leaders,
"as if the commission did
not do any work," 2 meaning that the commission's members did
not voice their own views.
(Druzic, considered a moderate and
a rising political star in Croatia, favors competition among
different political ideas and programs and is apparently at odds
with the less than moderate Brigic,
a political ally of the
former Prime Minister and Bosnian strongman Branko Mikulic).
The commission did make some practical proposals about
streamlining the CC from its current 165
members to 129
and
The
replacing the CC Presidium with a new Executive Body.
proposal was described as an organizational model that would
make the party's ruling body "more accountable
and more
effective."
Brigic said that there was still some disagreement over the
actual structure,
composition,
and role of this Executive
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but he outlined the commission's majority opinion
Body,
proposals.
According to these proposals,
the Executive Body
would be headed by a Secretary elected by the LCY cc for a
two-year term with the possibility of re-election for a second
term.
The members of the Executive Body would also be elected
from among CC members,
but it is not clear how many members
there would be.
According to Stefan Korosec,
currently the
Presidium's Executive Secretary,
some members on Brigic's
commission proposed that the Executive Body have 15 members and
no ex-officio members.
According to the commission,
the
Executive Body would not serve "as an independent political
body," rather it would serve "to ensure that the decisions and
conclusions of the LCY CC are implemented." The commission also
proposed that the LCY CC elect a President,
who would "direct
the work of the LCY CC," for a two-year term,
with or without
the possibility of reelection. The commission did not specify
whether the Secretary or the President would hold the reigns of
power in the LCY cc. Some commission members are opposed to the
creation of an Executive Body, claiming that it would weaken the
LCY CC.
Fundamental Issues Placed on a Back Burner.
The equivocal
nature of Brigic's speech and the commission's report suggests
that deep divisions within the party continue to block any
agreement on how to tackle the country's economic and political
crisis.
The protracted debate about a reformed party and its
role in a reformed political system has yet to yield any
concrete results. Much of what was said and proposed at the 26th
CC plenum had already been discussed at the First Conference of
the LCY in May 1988.
Major changes to the LCY Statutes cannot be made unttl a
platform has been agreed,
and that can take place only at the
14th (Extraordinary) Congress of the LCY tentatively scheduled
for mid-December. (Because of deep divisions in the party and
protracted party procedures,
there has been talk that the
congress may be held in mid-January 1990 instead.) The party
leadership has said that changes to the statues will then be
made sometime between this congress and the next; the gap
between congresses is usually four years.
The changes may well
coincide with the expected promulgation in 1992 of a new federal
constitution,
Yugoslavia's fifth since 1946.
The party
leadership is far from clear on the matter,
however,
and the
changes could come sooner.
Before then a number of other obstacles must be overcome.
For a start,
there has still been no formal proposal that the
LCY be transformed; according to normal procedure,
such a
proposal is needed before any decision about changes in the
statutes can be rnadeo
More important, the long-awaited plenum
on political pluralism and the party's official stance on this
matter has been put off,
which again suggests the leadership's
inability to agree on a common stand. In short, then, progress
toward party reform is proceeding at a snail's pace on account
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of the complicated legal procedures involved and the political
divisions in the party's hierarchy.
Indeed, one is tempted to
ask just what is required to clear the way for a political
framework within which Yugoslavia's myriad problems can be
tackled.
And what is likely to happen if the divisions and
obstacles are not overcome?
Milan Andrejevich
1

Vjesnik (Zagreb), 12 September 1989; Borba (Belgrade), 12 September 1989.

2

Vecernji List (Zagreb), 12 September 1989. The 26th cc plenum also adopted
a 19-point document on interethnic relations, which had been the main item
on the agenda at the 25th cc plenum on July 30 and 31.
Among its
conclusions,
the LCY cc stated that the most dangerous forms of
nationalism were those existing "in ruling political circles" throughout
the country,
which the "LCY has failed to combat." In his address to the
plenum, Celestin Sardelic, a member of Croatia's cc Presidium and a "guest
speaker" at the LCY cc gathering,
issued a sharp attack on Vojvodina's
provincial party committee,
saying that its criticism of a speech by
fellow Croat Ivica Racan at the 25th LCY cc plenum had been a "dogmatic and
Stalinist attack." He also accused Vojvodina of "supporting Serbian
nationalists in Croatia." Stefan Korosec and Croatia's party President,
Stanko Stojcevic,
however,
said that Sardelic's words
were not
appropriate to the occasion and that the matter should be placed on the
agenda at a later date and,
more important, that the matter first be
discussed among members of the cc Presidium and then between the party
leaderships of Croatia and Vojvodina.
stojcevic's response to Sardelic
suggests that a rift may be developing within Croatia's party hierarchy.
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Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned Movement's Conference•
Summary:

The ninth conference of the Nonaligned

Movement will be held

Belgradeo
topical

from

September 4 to 7 in

More than 100 countries will discuss
international issues,
and there are

plans to reform the movement.

* * *
From
September
4 to 7 the ninth conference of the
Nonaligned Movement will be held in Belgrade.
It is the third
time that Yugoslavia will attend a nonaligned meeting without
Josip Broz Tito and the second time that a nonaligned meeting
has taken place in Belgrade.
The Nonaligned Movement was
founded in 1955,
with Yugoslavia's help,
at the Bandung
Conference in Indonesia.
Its first conference to be held in
Yugoslavia,
which was organized by Tito,
Jawaharlal Nehru,
Gamal Abdel Nasser,
Kwame Nkhruma,
and Sukarno, was held in
Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961; 28 countries participated,
25
as full members and 3 as observers. There are now 102 full
members of the movement (which constitute a majority j_n the
United
Nations),
including
the
Palestine
Liberation
Organization (PLO)
and
the
South-West
African People's
organization (SWAPO),
and 10 countries or organizations with
permanent observer status.
This year Yugoslavia takes over
again as Chairman of the Nonaligned Movement until 1992.
The
chairmanship will be headed by the country's State President,
who at the moment is the 39-year-old Slovene Janez Drnovsek.
Background and Agenda. The forthcoming meeting is expected
to be attended by about 2,800 participants from 172 delegations,
including 53 heads of state, 11 Prime Ministers, and 44 Foreign
Ministers; 60 nonmember nations and institutions will send
observers, including Hungary and Poland. Some 1,800 Yugoslav
and 1,000 foreign journalists have been accredited for the
conference. The meeting will cost about half of what was spent
on the previous conference in Harare. 1
From September 1,
meetings will be held among the Foreign
Ministers of the member nations to discuss the final details of
the 18-point agenda on political and economic issues. The priority will be economic and financial matters,
including how to
reduce the nonaligned nations' combined debts of $1,300 billion.
Other topics will
include environmental protection; human
rights; the spread of dangerous contagious diseases, including
AIDS; the problem of refugees; and scientific and technological
development.
The delegations from the 17 Latin American and
Caribbean member nations are expected to plead for a worldwide
policy on combating the illegal trade in drugs. There will also
*

This paper originally appeared on 1 September 1989
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be discussion about whether to admit five new Latin American
members into the movement.
In addition,
the conference is
expected to discuss how the nonaligned nations might contribute
to settling the crises in the Middle East and Central American.
Budirnir Loncar, Yugoslavia's Federal Foreign Minister, has
described the agenda for the conference as heralding "a new
beginning in the work of the
nonaligned
movement" and as .
recognizing the "necessity to adopt the movement to the needs of
the modern world." 2 It was announced in September 1988, by the
conference of Foreign Ministers of nonaligned nations held in
Nicosia, Cyprus, that the way the movement operated was to be
reviewed; and there is certainly· general agreement that there
should be an attempt in the
future
to find "constructive
solutions instead of only issuing appeals.:. 3 In some quarters,
however, there is growing concern that the nonaligned movement,
which has traditionally been divided by a diversity of interests
and ideology, has long outlived its political effectiveness.
This is certainly the conviction of a number of politicians,
intellectuals, and journalists in Slovenia and Croatia.
Is Nonalignment Useful
to
Yugoslavia?
Although
Tito
established Yugoslavia as a major actor in the international
arena, his policy was in many respects out of keeping with
Yugoslavia's economic and political standing · as a country with
both developed and impoverished regions. It is now questionable
whether the country's international activities benefit it except
as an exercise in public relations.
Tito pursued a policy of nonalignment largely as a remedy
for the country's isolation after being expelled from the
Cominform by Stalin in 1948. Out of economic necessity Tito
turned to the West for help and received it, but he avoided the
ideological and political consequences of falling into the
Western sphere. By the late 1950s a policy of nonalignment had
been adopted,
and it was formally proclaimed in 1961. •rito's
Yugoslavia was to play a key role in the Nonaligned Movement,
though more in public diplomacy than in strictly economic terms.
These activities have led to Yugoslavia's close involvement
in Third World affairs and have created a wide range of problems
for it.
Moreover, critics in Tito's lifetime had argued that
Yugoslavia did not have the financial means to play the major
international role that Tito sought for it.
In spite of the
enormous political prestige that Tito enjoyed both at home and
abroad,
the general feeling among his few outspoken critics
during his lifetime, which was increasingly voiced after his
death, was that the continuation of such a foreign policy would
harm the country domestically and might result in new foreign
policy problems. This, indeed, has turned out to be the case.
For example, in recent years there has been discussion
among political and foreign affairs experts in Yugoslavia about
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whether the Nonaligned Movement should be oriented more toward
Europe or, as under Tito, toward the Third World; many people
consider that sufficient attention has not been paid to Western
Europe as it prepares for 1992.
It has also been remarked that
over the last 20 years Yugoslavia has lent massive amounts to
Third World countries that have never been paid back. In
general, it is often said, the Nonaligned Movement has achieved
very little, if anything.
Its towering founders, such as
Nasser, Nehru, and Sukarno, are gone; many of its members are in
dire economic straits; and in 28 years it has failed to develop
into an influential organization. Critics now ask what benefits
Yugoslavia can derive from such a relationship, located as the
country is in Europe and with a large work force in Western
Europe. The nonaligned countries are certainly in no political
or economic position to help Yugoslavia out of its current
problems. Furthermore, the superpowers have paid little notice
to the heterogeneous and disunited nonaligned bloc; this means
that Yugoslavia's reputation as the defender of the nonaligned
world is of little real worth.
Milan Andrejevich
1

Vecernje Novosti (Belgrade), 29 August 1989; Danas (Zagreb), 23 May 1989;
Borba (Belgrade), 4 October 1989. According to press reports, the Yugoslav
Federal Assembly earmarked $6,000,000-7,000,000 from the federal budget to
help pay for the conference.
An equivalent sum was donated by the
wealthier member nations of the movement. In addition, in preparation for
the meeting, buildings have been
renovated, parks improved, streets
repaved, and hotels and student dormitories remodeled; work has also been
done at Belgrade's international airport at surcin and the military airport
at Batajnici.

2

Borba, 21 August 1989; Tanjug, 17 August 1989.

3

Borba, 10 September 1988; Tanjug, 17 August 1989.
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East European Unemployment: the Yugoslav Example

Unemployment is likely to rise in East
European
countries
that
adopt
economic
liberalism.
The experience of Yugoslavia, the
European communist country furthest down the
road of economic reform, could offer lessons to
other communist countries.
Summary:

* * *
As the reforming countries of the East bloc introduce,
however haltingly,
market forces into their economies,
they
will have to work out the political,
economic and ideological
implications of rising unemployment.
Only one East European
country, Yugoslavia, has had any practice at dealing with this
problem on a large scale. Its experience could offer lessons to
its neighbors in the CMEA.
In the late 1950s and early 1960s Yugoslavia accelerated
its program of political and economic decentralization.
This
departure from Stalinist central planning toward so-called
self-management
gave
enterprises
greater
flexibility in
determining the size of their work-forces.
One consequence of
this new policy was a shortage of jobs for a growing proportion
of the population--particularly peasants who had been forced to
leave the countryside in the late 1940s because of the official
emphasis on industrialization..
The shortage of employment led
to a semi-legal trickle of emigrants from Yugoslavia.
By 1957
the trickle was of sufficient size to merit official comment. 1
In 1960 the government started to formalize the process.
A few
years later the trickle of 1957 had become a torrent,
and
Yugoslav "guestworkers" became an increasingly visible presence
in much of Western Europe.
Throughout
the
1960s
and early 1970s the Yugoslav
authorities allowed the emigration to continue mostly because,
economically,
they had little choice.
Tito's Yugoslavia,
moreover,
boasted proudly that it was a country of open
borders.
In some ways,
the self-management system was
economically more sensible and politically less repressive than
a heavily centralized one but it was not capable of absorbing
all the Yugoslav workforce.
Even with the exodus of emigrants,
unemployment remained at around 10% of the population. Without
that escape valve, however, it would have been much higher.
Despite the necessity of allowing emigration,
Yugoslav
politicians criticized it from time to time.
They said that
people were often going abroad not merely to acquire jobs,
but
to acquire better jobs; that too many of the emigrants were
those with special skills and therefore represented a loss for
the Yugoslav economy that had paid for their education; and that
these workers were open to the influence of emigre organizations
that were hostile to conununist Yugoslavia.
None of these
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objections was enough,
however,
halt the flood of emigrants.
Even President Tito's occasional expressions of dissatisfaction
did not lead to any serious effort to halt the process.

By the early 1970s,
however,
Tito's misgivings about
emigration became linked with his growing unease over the
intensifying nationalism in Yugoslavia, which itself was partly
the result of
liberalization
and decentralization.
The
year-long party purge that Tito launched in December 1971 in
order to defuse potential ethnic and regional conflict was aimed
especially at Croatian, Slovenian, and Serbian nationalism but
it
was
also
a
blow
against
political
and economic
liberalization.
Though the number of workers going abroad
continued to rise for the next two of years (the number of
emigres in 1973 was over 1,000,000),
criticism of emigration
became more pointed.
In December 1972,
for example,
Tito
warned that too many of these emigrants were of military age and
that "three entire armies" were outside Yugoslavia and were
therefore not
available for the Yugoslav armed forces. 2
High-ranking military figures repeated Tito's comments. 3 New
regulations were being prepared toward the end of 1973 to limit
the exodus, but the preparations were overtaken by events.
In October 1973 the Arab states launched their oil embargo,
and shortly after OPEC quadrupled the price of oil. The rise of
the price of oil caused an economic slowdown and a surge in
unemployment in the West. That in turn persuaded many Western
countries to introduce laws that restricted the inflow of new
guestworkers.
The regulations have remained in place ever
since.
The number of Yugoslavs working legally abroad has
remained fairly constant since 1973, with new arrivals balanced
by people returning to Yugoslavia.
The number of illegal
Yugoslav guestworkers has probably risen,
but it is impossible
to measure the numbers with any precision.
The obstacles encountered by Yugoslav emigrants in Western
countries suggests that other East European countries will have
difficulty exporting surplus
workers
to
the West on a
significant scale.
Poland allows workers to go Western Europe,
especially West Germany,
but the numbers are still relatively
small.
As pressure builds up on the governments of these countries
to do something about the shortage of jobs, they may be tempted
to open their borders to massive emigration,
just as the
Yugoslavs did when faced with a similar situation.
Western
countries would then face an awkward dilemma:
to live up to
their rhetorical invitations to East Europeans to come to the
West that they have repeated for over 40 years or to reject the
foreigners by closing their borders.
Ethnic hostility and the
opposition of unions and other workers to cheaper,
competitive
labor would make it very difficult for Western politicians to
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argue for more immigration.
In addition,
large-scale legal
immigration would strain the social welfare systems of Western
economies.
One temporary solution to this problem would be for Western
countries to accept a considerably larger number of illegal
guestworkers.
This,
however,
is unlikely to be a long-term
solution, and the Yugoslav press became very concerned early in
1989
about the the possibility that West Germany would
introduce stricter visa requirements for Yugoslav visitors. 4
Yugoslavs realize that
such
a
measure
would be aimed
specifically at curtailing illegal immigration.
Other Western
governments would probably introduce such legislation if there
was a huge migration of people from other East European
countries,
a situation that would become more likely if the
more conservative governments decided to introduce economic
reform.
Western
countries
have
been
largely hospitable to
Yugoslavia's exports of labor over the past 30 years,
but the
intensity and extent of the hospitality has depended largely on
the economic conditions prevailing in the West.
It is possible
that with Yugoslav,
Turkish,
and other guestworkers at their
present levels,
the West will balk at significantly greater
immigration. Reforming East European countries may have to cope
with the problems of unemployment independently.
David Goodlett
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For an example of this concern in the Yugoslav media,
26 February 1989, pp. 22-24.
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The Latest on Serbia's Public Loan Program.

Serbia's public loan program,
which was set up ostensibly
to promote economic reconstruction in Serbia,
is falling well
short of the $1 billion in hard currency and 2,000 billion
dinars that it was intended to raise.
On Septerr~er 15
the
Udruzena Beogradska Banka and Serbia's Socialist Alliance and
Trade Union issued the latest statistics for the program. 1 It
reported that paid subscriptions had been received between June
26 (when the program started) and September 5
totaling only
$16,500,000 in hard currency and 155
billion dinars.
(The
current, official exchange rate is 32,000 dinars to the dollar~)
An additional $16,500,000 and
424.3
billion
dinars
in
subscriptions have been pledged but not paid yet; and another
$331,200 and
16,400,000
dinars
have
been
received in
nonreturnable donations.
The response from Serbs abroad has fallen well short of the
expectations of the program's architects; and long before the
program was launched,
many Serbs in Yugoslavia had spent what
little savings they had on their vacations.
The officials
overseeing the project,
however, claim that the overseas side
of the program is only now beginning to take shape.
They also
claim that although domestic subscriptions were, indeed, slow on
account of the July and August holiday period, subscriptions and
payments should now pick up and start flowing in at a steady
rate.
Given the program's dismal showing so far, however, such
optimism seems unwarranted.
Critics had warned all along that
the program was pooriy planned and timed,
but only now have
officials in Serbia acknowledged any truth in the skeptics
rernarks. 2
When formulating the public loan program, Serbia's Economic
Reform Commission,
wh1ch is headed by Serbia's State President
Slobodan Milosevic,
also failed to pay sufficient attention to
the role that the agrarian sector would play in the scheme.
Serbia's agrarian institutions lack the financial resources to
fund projects or subscribe to the loan program; and the
republica~ government does not have sufficient funds to finance
reconstruction projects in agriculture.
The sale of bonds as part of this program has been
Milosevic's first major attempt to implement what he claims to
be economic reform in Serbia, and so far it is proving to be an
unqualified failureo
With subscriptions to the program ending
on 20 December 1989,
it seems unlikely that more than a tiny
percentage of the targeted figures will be achieved.
The whole scheme struck many people from the outset as
politically motivatedr
being an attempt at both political
mobilization of the populace and at collecting money for
politically important but economically d.ubiou.s projects,
such
as antiquated heavy industrial plants.
Moreover, many critics
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